Iraq and Climate Change: The Mainstream Lawyer\u27s Survival Guide by French, Duncan




This paper seeks to consider one simple question, namely how does an international
lawyer-especially a mainstream international lawyer (be that academic or practitioner)-
respond and adapt to problematic circumstances in international affairs? Of course, we
would like to think that we handle difficult situations reasonably well. Which of us would
not be able to sign up to the general view that "international law is inexorably intertwined
with the international system in which it operates"?' Understanding, applying, and per-
haps even rewriting international rules to the changing international scene are fundamen-
tal-and continuing-aspects of our discipline.2 But, scratching the surface a little
deeper, is it always true that as international lawyers, we cope when the circumstances on
the ground do not align neatly with the rules in the book?
Of course, by asking this, one immediately gets ensnared in definitional issues as to
what is meant by a 'mainstream' international lawyer. For pure ease of reference, I take
that to be the vast majority of those who practice, study, teach, and advise on international
law: those who approach their subject from a largely, though not necessarily exclusively,
doctrinal position. In other words, even if they are interested in the theoretical, the con-
textual, and the political, the 'mainstream' international lawyer will always seek to under-
* Thanks to those colleagues, both in my own department and elsewhere, with whom I have discussed
these thoughts. Contact details: dfrench@sheffield.ac.uk. The paper was delivered at the nineteenth annual
Australian and New Zealand Society of International Law (ANZSIL) conference (June 2010). The paper was
purposely written as an opinion-piece, and thus contains significantly fewer references than would ordinarily
be the case. All errors and omissions remain mine alone.
1. Rosalyn Higgins, International Law in a Changing International System, 58 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 78 (1999).
2. Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87
Am.J. INt'L L. 205, 205-15 (1993). "International legal rules, procedures, and organizations are more visible
and arguably more effective than at any time since 1945. If the United Nations cannot accomplish every-
thing, it once again represents a significant repository of hopes for a better world. And even as its current
failures are tabulated, from Yugoslavia to the early weeks and then months of the Somali famine, the almost-
universal response is to find ways to strengthen it. The resurgence of rules and procedures in the service of an
organized international order is the legacy of all wars, hot or cold." Id. (emphasis added).
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stand, above all else, the current state of the law.3 And for this majority, a changing world
presents many normative difficulties as they learn to assimilate new situations, especially
those that sit uncomfortably with the status quo or contradict the established way of doing
things.4 Of course, these lawyers are undoubtedly caricatures;5 all of us-perhaps some-
times subconsciously-make our own individual judgments as how to best reconcile law
with circumstance.6 Nevertheless, as purveyors of authoritative opinion,7 it is also impor-
tant for mainstream lawyers to be seen, to be able to assimilate such circumstances, and to
advise or comment accordingly.8
To give one example of a question that most of us have been asked by students-if you
like the classic fly-in-the-ointment irritant from the far too clever student-"you've just
told us that customary international law requires both a generality of state practice and a
settled opinio juris, but if that is the case, how come torture is contrary to international law
when most states in the world practice it in some form or other?"9 Similarly, in my inter-
national environmental law class, my students seem underwhelmed when I talk about the
obligation on states not to cause or permit significant harm beyond their territorial
boundaries;io-law and fact again seem to diverge significantly. Of course, we all know
what the standard response is, and while we all have our 'stock-in-trade' answers to such
questions, do we ever stop and ponder why we give the answers that we give? And even
for those of us who do acknowledge the limitations of the formal law in our response, do
we recognize the discrepancy between our, perhaps grudging, cognizance of the role
3. See Martti Koskenniemi, The Pull ofMainstream, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1946 (1990). "Ever since the Gro-
tian tradition became little more than an object of ritualistic invocation in keynote speeches at conferences of
learned societies, international lawyers have had difficulty accounting for rules of international law that do
not emanate from the consent of states against which they are applied. In fact, most modem lawyers have
assumed that international law is not really binding unless it can be traced to an agreement or some other
meeting of wills between two or more sovereign states." Id.
4. Id. at 1958-61.
5. See Guglielmo Verdirame, The Divided West: International Lawyers in Europe and America, 18 EUR. J.
INr'L L. 553 passim (2007) (addressing the methodological and theoretical divisions between European and
American international lawyers-which at many levels must itself be a caricature!).
6. Koskenniemi, supra note 3, at 1961.
7. See Oscar Schachter, The Invisible College of International Lawyers, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 217, 220-21
(1977). "[A] judgment among competing principles by an independent jurist can be made and justified on
grounds that are valid for the relevant community of states, rather than on grounds held by the individual
alone, or by his government. This, at least, is the position that must be taken by international lawyers who
are acting as nonofficial experts and not as advocates of a government or special interest." Id.
8. See id. at 220-23.
9. See, e.g., Christopher Joyner, Teaching International Law: Views From an International Relations Political
Scientist, 5 ILSA J. INr'L & CoMp. L. 377, 3 77-87 (1999) (addressing issues surrounding the teaching of
international law).
10. See U.N. Conference on Env't and Dev., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Develop-
ment, Principle 2. "States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and
developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do
not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."
Id. See also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.CJ. 226, 241-42
(July 8). The existence of the general obligation of States "to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or
control" respect "the environment of other States or of areas beyond" national control is now part of the
corpus of international law relating to the environment. Id.
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global politics plays in international law and our persistent principled adherence to an
international system premised upon the rule of law?1
It is perhaps worth just saying a few words on why this matter has come to the forefront
recently for me. In fact, it largely has sprung from two very different political events-
though I recognize that while these events are contemporarily important, on both issues,
international law has been here before,12 and thus it is important to play down the hyper-
bole that often surrounds the identification of particular situations for our own ends.13
First, I listened to the evidence to the independent inquiry on Iraq in the U.K. (the
Chilcot Inquiry),' 4 especially in relation to how international legal advice within govern-
ment was sought (or, in some instances, not sought), considered, and ultimately 'man-
aged.' Second, I watched the collapse of the Copenhagen Climate Change negotiations in
December 2009 and the apparent move away from multilateral governance towards some-
thing much more selective, discretionary and, most of all, political.15 Though extremely
different in scope and content, there is a general sense that both situations illustrate the
inherent limitations of international law (and the international lawyer) to affect, and where
necessary, constrain political action, which is contrary to normative expectations.16
H. Pragmatist-Theorist-Mainstream International Lawyer
Of course, for those who might consider themselves either 'pragmatists' or 'theorists,'-
thus consciously moving away from straight doctrinal positivism-things look slightly dif-
ferent. And, though the pragmatist and the theorist are, in their outlooks, worlds apart, I
have always thought that there is little material difference between them when they are
presented with new situations or a changed set of circumstances in international affairs. In
particular, both would seem to possess the necessary methodological 'devices' to adapt
to-or encounter confidently-new challenges, as well as having an awareness of the im-
portance of retaining the political within the law.'7 The pragmatist, by definition, will
take new situations or circumstances in stride; the pragmatist's lack of commitment to any
paradigm permits him maximum flexibility to vary his approach with the changing tide.
11. See Sustainable Development and the Instinctive Imperative of fustice in the Global Order, in GLOBAL JUs-
TICE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 33 (Duncan French ed., forthcoming Oct. 2010). "The interna-
tional community will ultimately be judged by the measures that it takes. But without concepts and
overarching principles, the international community neither has the foundations on which to act nor a sense
of direction in which to head." Id. (references omitted).
12. Hilary Charlesworth, International Law: A Discipline of Crisis, 65 MOD. L. REv. 377, 377 (2002) (relying
on INTERNKrIONAL INCIDENTS: THE LAW THAT COUNTS IN WORLD POLITICS 15 (W. Michael Reisman &
Andrew R. Willard eds., 1988). "Michael Reisman has argued that crises or 'incidents'-defined as 'overt
conflict[s] between two or more actors in the international system'-should be at the heart of teaching and
scholarship in international law." Id. (references omitted).
13. See id. at 382-84.
14. See Iraq Inquiry, http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/ (last visited Aug. 2010).
15. See Navroz K Dubash, Commentary, Copehagen: Climate ofMistrust, 44 EcoN. & POL. WKLY. 8, 10
(2009), available at http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/COP.pdf. "Despite this, the final 'Copen-
hagen Accord' only barely papered over what was an almost complete collapse of negotiations. The outcome
calls into question whether the community of nations can, in fact, craft an effective response to climate
change." Id.
16. See id. at 8-11.
17. See Burley, supra note 2, at 239 ("In the end, law informed by politics is the best guarantee of politics
informed by law.").
FALL 2010
1022 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
The theorist may struggle a bit more, but will often, through his usual ingenuity, discern a
necessary exception to, or occasionally even a wholesale modification of, his general un-
derstanding of the world.
On the other hand, the mainstream international lawyer often seems to struggle to
absorb and adapt to changing circumstances. The individual lawyer will, of course, re-
spond intuitively-and no two individuals will react in quite the same way-but will often
seem to lack confidence in his doctrine. Nevertheless, there are perhaps three standard
responses. First, the mainstream international lawyer may simply play down the signifi-
cance (the legal influence) of new or difficult situations by dismissing them as temporary,
aberrant, or (staying on trusted legal territory) lacking the necessary "norm-creating char-
acter"' 8 to rise above the normative de minimis litmus test of relevance.' 9 Moreover, as
the International Court noted in Nicaragua: "[IMnstances of State conduct inconsistent
with a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indica-
tions of the recognition of a new rule."20 As a general mantra for the mainstream interna-
tional lawyer, this seems wholly apposite.
Second, when new circumstances cannot be ignored, the mainstream international law-
yer may feel that the easiest way to respond is simply to fit those changes within estab-
lished legal rules and processes, believing it important to show the seamless nature of the
international legal system and that current law already regulates and explains each and
every state of affairs. After all, nothing is beyond law's regulation. 21 To quote Oppenheim's
International Law: "[E]very international situation is capable of being determined as a mat-
ter of law."22 Or, to paraphrase altogether more timeless words: "[T]here is nothing new
under the sun." 23
Third, circumstances may arise that are wholly novel in character, and in these situa-
tions international lawyers may decide that they have little choice but to engage; however,
the engagement will always be decisive. Mainstream lawyers have the authority and the
capacity, whether they acknowledge it or not, to convey their understanding of a new state
of affairs. They may not be able to impose their views of the world on everyone, but
18. North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 42 (Feb. 20). This is, of course,
somewhat of a misuse of the International Court's term, which specifically refers to the emergence of new
rules of customary law. Id. at 41-42. Nevertheless, the term more generally reflects the "gatekeeper" func-
tion which both judges and lawyers have in determining which (and when) factual situations are considered to
have legal effect.
19. See Matthew D. Adler, Why De Minimis?, 2-3 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory,
Working Paper No. 07-26, 2007), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=992878.
20. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 98 (une
27).
21. Perhaps the most controversial example of this idea is the Martens Clause, under which it has been
argued that, notwithstanding the lack of treaty or customary humanitarian law, "inhabitants and the belliger-
ents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the
usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public con-
science." Convention Between the United States and Other Powers Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, preamble, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277. See also Antonio Cassese, The Martens Clause: Halfa
Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky?, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 187 (2000).
22. 1 OPPENHELM's INTERNATIONAL LAw 13 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., Longman 9th ed.
1996).
23. Ecclesiastes 1:9 (IV) (The full quotation is: "What has been will be again, what has been done will be
done again; there is nothing new under the sun.").
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undoubtedly their opinions count-and, by and large, they know it. Their opinions will
be respected and have an influence above and beyond their own discipline. In short, how
they perceive a situation will often color how others come to interpret it. As Hilary
Charlesworth noted in the aftermath of the 1999 Kosovo conflict and the unresolved sta-
tus of humanitarian intervention in international law, "[international lawyers revel in a
good crisis. A crisis provides a focus for the development of the discipline and it also
allows international lawyers the sense that their work is of immediate, intense rele-
vance."
24 Of course, Charlesworth rejects this approach, going on to remark that a system
that dwells exclusively upon crisis "shackles international law to a static and unproductive
rhetoric." 25 On this basis, she was surely correct to highlight how many international
lawyers innately are attracted to and respond to new states of affairs.26
Issues as diverse as the recent global financial crisis, 27 the rise of the threat of cyber-
warfare, 28 the possibility of using geo-engineering techniques to tackle global environ-
mental harm, 2 9 and, of course, the perennial matter of the use (or misuse) of state military
forceso all demand a response from the mainstream international lawyer. And is not the
modus operandi of any lawyer the assertion of a definitive position, backed up by a belief
in his own confident understanding of the law? Let political scientists debate; interna-
tional lawyers inform and tell. But this confidence in our position is shallow for critics
(both those within and without our own discipline);3' mainstream lawyers lack the appro-
priate methodology and insight to truly grasp a changing world-our understanding is
either simply too limited to capture the fast-changing nature of social, political, and eco-
nomic phenomena or we are seen as forever playing catch up to events already passed. In
1997 Philip Alston wrote of the 'myopia of the handmaidens. 32 He was particularly not-
ing the changing role of the state in the light of the changes wrought by globalization, but
his comment that "these changes seem often to be noted or analysed [by "much of the
24. Charlesworth, supra note 12.
25. Id.
26. Even when the "new state of affairs" is not a crisis per se, but rather the emergence of a new discipline
or sub-discipline within international law (for instance, international environmental law or international
criminal law), significant academic attention seems naturally to flow toward the change, perhaps at the ex-
pense of more general, traditional areas of the law.
27. See, e.g., Detlev F. Vagts, Editorial Comment, The Financial Meltdown and Its International Implications,
103 AM. J. INT'L L. 684 (2009).
28. See, e.g., Jeffrey T.G. Kelsey, Note, Hacking Into International Humanitarian Law: The Principles ofDis-
tinction and Neutrality in the Age of Cyber Warfare, 106 MICH. L. REv. 1427 (2008).
29. See, e.g., John Virgoe, International Governance ofa Possible Genengineering Intervention to Combat Climate
Change, 95 CLIMATIC CHANGE 103 (2009).
30. See, e.g., Russell K. Jackson, Lawlessness Within a Foreign State as a Legal Basis for United States Military
Intervention to Restore the Rule of Law, 187 MIL. L. REv. 1 (2006).
31. Anthony Carry, Critical international Law: Recent Trends in the Theory of International Law, 2(1) EuR. J.
INT'L L. 66 (1991). "The crucial question is simply whether a positive system of universal international law
actually exists, or whether particular states and their representative legal scholars merely appeal to such posi-
tivist discourse so as to impose a particularist language upon others as of if were a universally accepted legal
discourse. So post-modernism is concerned to unearth difference, heterogeneity and conflict as reality in place
of fictional representations of universality and consensus ... The role of the international lawyer in such an
acutely relativised, self-reflective culture is now, more than ever, crucial. It is his function to resist phony,
reified would be universalist legal discourse in favour of the recognition of the inevitably restrictive and exclu-
sive nature of individual state discourses" (emphasis in original). Id.
32. Philip Alston, The Myopia of the Handmaidens: International Lawyers and Globalization, 3 EUR. J. INT'L L.
435, 448 (1997).
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mainstream of international law scholarship"] in an almost perfunctory manner in order to
demonstrate a degree of analytical completeness," 33 seems to me to be greatly relevant
here.
Thus, in a situation where the mainstream lawyer is perceived as needing to formally
assimilate global change, but lacks the necessary analytical wherewithal to be able to truly
decipher it, the mainstream lawyer seems to be continually pitched between two opposing
positions. Alternatively phrased, it would appear-at least on the surface-that the main-
stream international lawyer constantly struggles within the paradox between, on the one
hand, believing in the existence of an objective normative framework which can constrain
political acts and, on the other, recognizing (but concurrently often seeking to ignore) the
inherently political context within which international law must inevitably operate.34
The remainder of this paper, accepting that this paradox is at the heart of international
law-and the work of the international lawyer-seeks to suggest, however, that such a
view is primarily a caricature of our position; that to quote Daniel Bodansky, most inter-
national lawyers are not "one-dimensionally normative" but are indeed capable of seeing
the "world in a multi-dimensional way." 35 Saying this is not to provide a rather easy
'defense' to the claim that the mainstream international lawyer is ineffective in the face of
circumstances that fall outside his or her traditional certainty and field of inquiry. Rather,
and more specifically, I think it is about seeking to replace the caricature with a much
more nuanced appreciation of the position of the majority of international lawyers.
III. Iraq and Climate Change: 'plus ga change, plus c'est la mime chose'
It is probably not too surprising that I have chosen Iraq and climate change as two
recent examples of where law and politics seem to have diverged. Of course, individual
views will vary, and even within the international legal community itself, there will be
genuine and diverse opinions not only on the substance of both of these matters, but also
on the implications of the outcomes. Nevertheless, there is still an overall assumption
made by some, I would suggest, that international lawyers either struggle to comprehend
the dynamics of these situations or, even if we can comprehend them, seek to assimilate
them artificially, and without principle, into our own normative 'world-view.'
First, I will consider the evidence before the Chilcot Inquiry on the use of international
legal advice to British government ministers preceding the 2003 Iraq conflict.36 Much
interest has come out concerning the inner workings of the U.K. government, both gener-
ally and specifically in the period before, during, and after the immediate conflict.3 7 We
were, of course, alerted to inner tensions within the Foreign Office by the resignation of
Elizabeth Wilmshurst as Deputy Legal Advisor just days prior to the conflict in March
33. Id. at 435, 446.
34. Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, I EUR. J. INT'L L. 4, 12 (1990). "Mainstream
doctrine retreats into general statements about the need to 'combine' concreteness and normativity, realism
and idealism, which bear no consequence to its normative conclusion." Id.
35. Daniel M. Bodansky, International Law in Black and White, 34 GA. J. LN'L & Comp. L. 285, 289-90
(2006), available at httpd/ssrn.com/abstract=887767.
36. Richard N. Taylor, Chikot Inquiry: Iraq Papers Show Lord Goldrnith's Warning to Tony Blair, GUARDIAN
(U.K.), June 30, 2010, httpJ/www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/jun/30/chilcot-inquiry-lord-goldsrnith-blair.
37. Id.
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2003.38 We have now learned much more about the way the international law officers,
and their advice, were treated at this time.30 The testimony of both the politicians and the
then law officers has thus been intriguing in this regard.40 But I do not want to dwell on
the substance, or even how the Attorney General's final opinion fundamentally shifted in
both tone and content immediately preceding the use of military force.41 What has par-
ticularly interested me is the release of confidential correspondence within government,
the oral testimony at the Inquiry, and what this tells us about how legal argument and
international law were perceived at this time. 42
Four passages struck a particular chord:
* "I have been very forcefully struck by a paradox in the culture of government lawyers,
which is that the less certain the law is, the more certain in their views they be-
come . . . On the one hand, in well-rehearsed areas of domestic law the advice I am
offered has usually been acute, but also admitted to a range of possibilities. On the
other hand, in issues of international law, my experience is of advice which is more
dogmatic, even though the range of reasonable interpretations is almost always
greater than in respect of domestic law."4 3
* "[B]ecause there is no court, the legal adviser and those taking decisions based on
legal advice, have to be all the more scrupulous in adhering to the law. . . ."44
* "I am as committed as anyone to international law and its obligations, but it is an
uncertain field. There is no international court for resolving such questions in the
manner of a domestic court."4s
* "Why has this been put in writing?"46
Of course, there is much that one could say. One could, for instance, highlight the
inappropriateness of so-called "sofa government" (i.e., decisions taken in the absence of
formal procedures often with special advisors)47 and the way legal advice was sought, man-
aged, and largely ignored-as well as, in this case, externalized through the seeking of
38. Richard N. Taylor, War Resignation Letter Censored, GUARDIAN (U.K), Mar. 24, 2005, http://www.
guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/mar/24/uk.iraq.
39. Id.
40. Britain's Iraq Inquiry Panel Travels to US to Question Officials Over Errors in 2003 Invasion, Fox NEws,
May 18, 2010, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/05/18/britains-iraq-inquiry-panel-travels-question-offi-
cials-errors-invasion/.
41. See Philipe Sands, LAwLEss WORLD: MAKING AND BREAKING GLOBAL RULEs (2006), for more on
this issue and why it matters in international relations.
42. Christopher Hobe, Iraq Inquiry: Secret Government Documents Could Contradict Public Evidence, TELE-
GRAPH (U.K), Feb. 8, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/7190630/Iraq-in-
quiry-Secret-Government-documents-could-contradict-public-evidence.html.
43. Letter from Jack Straw MP, then British Foreign Secretary, to the then Attorney General, Lord Gold-
smith (Feb. 6, 2003), available at http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/43520/doc_2010_01_26_11_05_30.
485.pdf.
44. Testimony of Sir Michael Wood, then Foreign Office Legal Advisor, to the Chilcot Inquiry Oan. 26,
2010), available at http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/44205/20100126am-wood-final.pdf.
45. Id.
46. Chris Ames, Why Has This Been Put Into Writing?, IRAQ INQUIRY DIGEST, Jan. 27, 2010, http-I/www.
iraqinquirydigest.org/?p=6592 (the alleged reaction in Downing Street to a confidential paper written by
Michael Wood looking at the potential consequences of engaging in an illegal war, including the commission
of the crime of aggression).
47. Max Hastings, The Sofa Government of Blairim Has Been An Unmitigated Disaster, GUARDIAN (U.K),
May 16, 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/may/16/commnent.labour.
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independent legal opinions. 4 8 As Wilmshurst noted, the decision-making process was
"lamentable."49 Or, one could consider the way certain Ministers seemed to resist the
constitutional practice of allowing government legal advisers to give the "advice which
they honestly consider to be correct."50 But moving away from the minutiae and towards
a more general perspective, what has most struck me has been the conflation of legal
argument and the law itself-as Jack Straw (so inelegantly) said: "I am committed as
anyone to international law and its obligations, but it is an uncertain field."5 ' With one
sentence, it would seem that we have moved from a normative system of law to law as an
instrument of political efficacy; or, taken to the extreme, to the abandonment of legal
certainty and the subversion of legal principle. Law is but the argument that one wishes to
construct at any particular time. Realists and critical legal scholars have always sought to
argue that this-or something like this-is the case. 52 But how do mainstream lawyers
respond to such arguments, without either appearing to fall into the trap of accepting the
fatalism inherent within such remarks or rejecting them and being seen to endorse the
idealism of extreme legal positivism, which would simply reaffirm the caricature?
I now turn to the 2009 Copenhagen session of the climate change Conference of the
Parties.53 The stalling of the multilateral negotiations, the negotiation by a select few of
the Copenhagen Accord, and the ultimately unsuccessful attempt to parachute the latter
into the former suggested to many the death knell of the multilateral process.54 As
Rajamani has noted,
The Copenhagen Accord was reached among twenty-nine states, including all major
emitters and economies, as well as those representing the most vulnerable and least
developed. The Conference of Parties (CoP) neither authorized the formation of this
group to negotiate the accord, nor was it kept abreast of the negotiations as they
evolved... [W]hen the accord was presented to the CoP for adoption late on Decem-
ber 18, it was categorically rejected by, among others, Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Su-
dan, Venezuela and Tuvalu. They did so both because of the manifest procedural
irregularities in the negotiation of this accord as well as the substantive weaknesses
they perceived in it.55
48. UK Legal Process on Iraq 'lamentable', Says Er Adviser, BBC, Jan. 26, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/84
81111.stm.
49. Id.
50. Note from Lord Peter Henry Goldsmith, U.K Attorney General, to Jack Straw, U.K Foreign Secre-
tary (Feb. 3, 2003), available at http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/43514/doc_201001_26_1l_04_38_615.
pdf.
51. Note from Jack Straw, U.K Foreign Secretary, to Michael Wood, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Chief Legal Advisor (Jan. 29, 2003), available at httpd/www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/4351/doc_2010_01-
2611_04_18_456.pdf.
52. The United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, UNFCC, http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop-
15/items/5257.php (last visited Sept. 15, 2010).
53. See Daniel Bodansky, The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Post-Mortem, 104 Am. J. Ir'Lt L.
230, available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract -id=1553167.
54. Id.
55. Lavanya Rajamani, Copenhagen Accord: Neither Fish Nor FoIW, CPRINDIA.ORG, available at http://www.
india-seminar.com/2010/606/606_1avanya-rajamani.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2010).
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Some, more optimistically, hoped the Accord would be a first step to galvanize the
global talks that are to take place in the last two months of 2010.56 Others felt the Accord
was itself adequate and the need for a further legally binding text would be an unnecessary
turn to law, whereas global politics had already moved on.57
Whatever the actual long-term impact of the Accord, the climate change debate has
changed, perhaps irrevocably. It is slowly transforming itself from being an exclusively
inter-governmental debate into a transnational one as well, where domestic regulation and
national policy of especially the leading players (both in the developed and developing
world) are able to have as much impact upon international behavior as global negotiation
and 'law-making.'5 The commitments made by individual countries annexed to the Co-
penhagen Accord are themselves evidence, if undoubtedly controversial, of a move away
from obligations agreed within and as part of a global binding deal. 59 Is it not the case
that such voluntary commitments lack the necessary normative imprint that international
law bestows and requires? These commitments are, ultimately, no more or no less than
voluntary pledges of national action.60 As the Executive Secretary to the Climate Change
Convention had cause to note:
The phrase "In light of the legal character of the Accord . . ." should be read in its
context. In using the phrase, the secretariat sought to convey two facts regarding the
legal nature of the Accord. First, that since the Conference of the Parties neither
adopted nor endorsed the Accord, but merely took note of it, its provisions do not
have any legal standing within the UNFCCC process even if some Parties decide to
associate themselves with it. Secondly, that since the Accord is a political agreement,
rather than a treaty instrument subject to signature, a simple letter or note verbale to
the secretariat from an appropriate authority in Government is sufficient to commu-
nicate the intention of a Party to associate with the Accord.61
Thus, not only is the Accord arguably indicative of the failure of multilateralism as a
model of governance (in this instance, in any event) but also of the emergence of a new
dynamic between domestic law and global objectives without the necessary intervention of
international law. Whatever one's view of the Accord, as an approach to global negotia-
56. See Alister Doyle & Gerard Wynn, New Climate Talks Set for 2010; Gloom for Treaty, REUTERS, Apr. 11,
2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6372AT20100411.
57. For discussion, see Bodansky, supra note 53, at 230, 235, 238-40.
58. Moreover, in addition to the attempt by some States to affect the activity of other States, a related
feature is the emergence of "network administration" and "hybrid and private administration," on which
Kingsbury highlights the increasingly complex forms of regulation and administration that are now involved
in international environmental governance. As he notes, the traditional model (what he terms "distributed
administration"-an action "performed largely by organs of national governments, acting pursuant to interna-
tional agreements"-is increasingly challenged by the use of other administrative forms, such as networks of
(more informal) government officials, private standard-setters, and hybrids of both public and private actors.
See Benedict Kingsbury, Global Environmental Governance as Administration: Implications for International Law,
in THE OxFoRD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 64, 79-81 (Daniel Bodansky, Jutta
Brmne & Ellen Hey eds., 2007).
59. See U.N. Climate Change Secretariat, Clarification Relating to the Notification of 18 January 2010,
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tion-perhaps even to global regulation-its potential significance to both climate change
and on other subjects cannot be ignored. But how should the mainstream lawyer re-
spond? Do we resort to a grudging acceptance of the realpolitik while hoping for a better
normative future? Or do we somehow seek to interpret a political settlement in legal
terms-to take legal ownership of it? Either position would surely condemn us to being
the type of lawyer mentioned by Alston, who notes or analyzes change in an "almost
perfunctory manner." 62
IV. Moving Beyond the Caricature: The 'Skeptical' Mainstream Lawyer
In both instances-the evidence before the Chilcot Inquiry and the negotiation of the
Copenhagen Accord-established norms and procedures have seemingly been either ig-
nored or jettisoned in favor of something much more pliable and acceptable. 63 Wasn't it
always this way? Perhaps. And certainly there is nothing new here in the abandonment of
legal principle or the rejection of global governance for reasons of politics or international
relations. Nor is it too controversial to say that most international lawyers innately find
such instances a rather sad, if often inevitable, indictment of the limitations of our disci-
pline. But straying beyond that, isn't it a rather jaded perception of the mainstream inter-
national lawyer to suggest he or she is unable to cope with such challenges?
I would suggest that it is, but refuting the claim is not enough. What one also needs to
do is then to go on to find an appropriate rejoinder to such a caricature. One attempt to
highlight the need for international lawyers to move beyond focusing just on the chal-
lenges we face was contained in Charlesworth's 2002 Modern Law Review article.64 She
noted that "[a] concern with crises skews the discipline of international law. Through
regarding 'crises' as its bread and butter and the engine of progressive development of
international law, international law becomes simply a source of justification for the status
quo." 65 Thus, one response to difficult questions is to recognize that, although there will
inevitably be bumps in the road, we should not dwell upon them; rather we should
'refocus' the discipline into "an international law of everyday life." 66 In other words, we
should seek to develop a discipline that concentrates upon the ordinary-the concerns of
the majority-or what Charlesworth refers to as the "non-elite groups." 67 This leads me
to wonder whether Thomas Franck was also right when he argued:
The moral pursuit of distributive justice should engage us because, like Socrates, our
intellects should harbor an 'all-engrossing eagerness for answers to moral questions,
beginning with the most urgent of all: how should we live?' The question of fairness
62. Alston, supra note 32, at 436.
63. It might, however, be argued that these two instances have less in common than I suggest. As one
colleague noted in response to an earlier draft of this paper, "Iraq focuses on the interpretation of existing law
and the role of the lawyer within a very political context whereas the Copenhagen Accord arguably reflects
the beginning of a fundamental change in which rules/regimes are negotiated or developed" (email on file
with author). Though this is an extremely incisive understanding of these two situations, I still believe that
both raise fundamental questions as to how we, as international lawyers, respond to difficult international
situatlons.
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encompasses that moral issue because fairness supposes a moral compass, a sense of
the just society. The law must create solutions and systems which take into account
society's answers to these moral issues of distributive justice, for we are moral as well
as social beings.68
There is a great deal of merit in this kind of approach. Not responding in a knee-jerk
fashion to every instance of seeming defiance of a legal norm or the occurrence of an
incidence which is outside of our normative comfort zone, but rather acknowledging that
our more fundamental purpose-our raison d'itre-is to focus upon, and seek to tackle, the
perennial dilemmas of international society.
Personally, I have always been attracted to this type of approach, and it is obviously
needed, if only to act as a counterbalance to the paradigm of being seen to react to singu-
lar events. But is a shift in focus itself enough to prevent the formation of the view that
mainstream lawyers are obsessed by form over substance and that mainstream lawyers are
unable to cope with difficulty and change? Perhaps what we also need to do is engage-
and to be seen engaging-more productively and less reactively with the view that inter-
national law (and the international lawyer) does not operate within a sealed vacuum of
rules, principles, and institutional processes, but rather that law (and the lawyer) is very
much at ease in the messy world of the political. As I noted earlier, this means seeing the
world in a "multi-dimensional way." One attempt to grasp this nettle was set out, if only
in passing, by Daniel Bodansky in his review of Goldsmith and Posner's 2005 book, The
Limits of International Law.69 The book propounds the use of "rational choice theory" in
international law. 70 Many of its central claims are made by implicitly contrasting its ap-
proach with that of supposed mainstream lawyers, who (as Bodansky notes) are presuma-
bly "uncritical believers in the normative force of international law."71
But this is where the argument surely fails; mainstream lawyers-in Bodansky's view-
share many of the fundamental premises of those more obviously critical of the interna-
tional legal system. 72 Namely, (i) that states have their own national interests which they
will pursue for their own ends; (ii) that rules of international law generally reflect these
interests; (iii) that state interests also impact the nature and level of compliance with inter-
national law; (iv) that states will interpret international law as far as possible in light of
their interests; and (v) that power-in its infinite variety of shades-plays a significant role
in the development and enforcement of the law.73
In agreeing with Bodansky as to the simplicity of the view that we are all "uncritical
believers" what I would suggest is that we more actively, and more honestly, grapple with
the challenges of the international system-accepting all the apparent impurities within
the normative order that this will mean. 74 This is not so that international law simply
becomes an instrumental exercise in explaining state behavior or to agree with Jack Straw
68. THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JNSTflTIlONs 8 (1995).
69. Bodansky, supra note 35; JACK L. GOLDSMITH & Ejuc. A POSNER, THE LiMrrs OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2005).
70. Bodansky, supra note 35, at 285.
71. Id. at 288.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 288-89.
74. Id. at 289.
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that international law is innately "uncertain."7 5 Nor even to view international law as
'law-in-context' writ large; we are not seeking to place international law within the social,
economic, and political global order for its own sake. Rather, we do so to better clarify
how to make international law work effectively in the light of the realities in which it must
operate. We are all aware that the positivist mainstream lawyer is, by and large, a parody;
what interests me is that we often fall back into this mode when the political world be-
comes too unclear and indeterminate.
So how does one then respond, in the particular instances, of the issues presented by the
Chilcot Inquiry and the Copenhagen Accord? Though space prevents a detailed analysis,
let me make three brief comments building upon the previous analysis. First, we must
continue to assert the role of international law in international affairs. Though we accept
the politics of a situation, this does not mean that we should be swayed in all directions
because of them. There is nothing odd in the argument that as lawyers we continue to
prefer an international system that is built on the precepts and rules of international law,
rather than the bare power so emblazoned still within the realpolitik.
Even in those situations where law is purposively or recklessly absent, it is the role of
the international lawyer (among others) to seek to bring it back to a normative framework
or reference point as soon as possible. This is not the same as defending the indefensible
or seeking to apologize for everything that is not law. Rather, it is about recognizing that
the international community itself has learned that over time, long-term progress only
usually happens when all participants decide to speak again the same language, and that
language remains international law.76 This is not to eschew the question of legal responsi-
bility when breaches do occur, but to recognize that finding a violation is not the principal
goal of any legal system. So, in throwing up our hands on listening to statements such as
Jack Straw's (reflecting, as a microcosm, the views of a number of people at the time in
disregarding the letter of the UN Charter prior to the Iraq conflict), this should not divert
attention away from the role international law can play in affecting positive change, most
conspicuously within a normatively-ordered framework.77
Second, such a belief in international law should not disguise the fact that legally bind-
ing rules are not the only way forward in an ever-complex international society. As
d'Aspremont notes:
Many recent developments-like networks among governmental officials or transna-
tional law-have shown that non-legal instruments may prove more adapted to the
speed and complexity of modern international relations and are more and more re-
75. Iraq: Jack Straw Defiant over Ignoring Legal Advice, BBC, Jan. 27, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk
news/politics/8483506.stm.
76. Cf Carty, supra note 31, at 11-12 ("[Koskenniemil stresses how far the evasive rhetoric of the contem-
porary practice of the discipline serves to continue a guarantee of the professional autonomy which comes
from the modernist/formalist approach to law . .. International legal language sees each discursive topic (e.g.
sovereignty) to be constituted by a conceptual opposition. Indeed the opposition is what the topic is about.
Disagreement persists because it is impossible to priorize one term over the other. These terms turn out to
depend upon one another.").
77. James Chapman, Iraq War Was a Crime of Aggression: The Damning Verdict of Top Whitehall Lawyers
Which No.10 Refinsed to Accept, DAILY 1AIL, Jan. 27, 2010, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1246312/
Chilcot-inquiry-Iraq-. . .verdict-Whitehall-lawyers-invading-Iraq-ministers-refused-accept.html.
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sorted to in practice. Non-legal instruments can be at least as integrative for a com-
munity as legal ones.78
As lawyers, we have come to acknowledge, or arguably had no choice but to accept, soft
law, and perhaps it is also time to engage with it more positively. Indeed, it is important
to note that despite the political nature of the Copenhagen Accord and its avoidance of
international law, it has not avoided the international process. 79 Thus, whatever the rela-
tive merits and weaknesses of the Copenhagen Accord, one of its strengths is the fact that
it sought endorsement from the Conference of the Parties as a means of enhancing its
legitimacy.80 The fact that the Conference of the Parties merely took note of the Accord,
despite enormous pressure to embrace it fully, says something, many believe, about the
enduring quality of multilateral governance. 8'
In any event, law has never been restricted to an analysis of the rules. We should
equally be concerned with the nature and scope of law-making and decision-making
processes, the institutions that build up around. such rules and processes, the means of
promoting compliance and dispute settlement, as well as asking why in certain situations
law has remained relatively intangible and soft. Lawyers should also be prepared to criti-
cally analyze who is participating (and who is marginalized) in the law and decision-mak-
ing process. 82 An assessment that restricts itself to looking only at rules is bound to
misrepresent the true nature of international law. Thus, the Copenhagen Accord may be
a political document, but it cannot be understood without reference to the broader legal
and institutional narrative in which it must share space. In other words, as lawyers, we
should affirm the international process without a slavish commitment to traditional styles
of obligation as the only way forward in all situations.
Third, we might do well to dwell on-yet subtly invert-the traditional positivist ca-
non, as most clearly stated by the Permanent Court in The Lotus (1927), namely that
"[r]estrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed."83 The
strength of positivism is that it continues to emphasize the overriding significance of state
practice in explaining the development of international law. Whilst it has been right to
denounce the absolutist nature of how this most famous of dictums from The Lotus has
been understood, 84 perhaps we should not completely disregard the kernel of important
truth that it contains. Namely, that states jealously guard their independence, even in an
78. Jean d'Aspremont, Softness in International Law: A Self-Serving Quest for New Legal Materials, 19 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 1075, 1088-89 (2008).
79. Cf Bodansky, supra note 53, at 238-39. "The Copenhagen Accord asserts that it will be 'operational
immediately,' but fully operationalizing its terms will require further acts . . . The terms of the Accord pre-
sume that this work will be carried out by the COP [the treaty's Conference of the Parties]. But given the
COP's inability to adopt the Copenhagen Accord, this presumption appears tenuous at best." Id.
80. Dubash, supra note 15, at 8.
81. Jacob Werksman, "Taking Note" of the Copenhagen Accord: What It Means, WORLD RESOURCES INsT.,
Dec. 20, 2009, http://www.wri.org/stories/2009/12/taking-note-copenhagen-accord-what-it-means.
82. See Karen Morrow, Sustainable Development and the Instinctive Imperative ofjustice in the Global Order, in
GLOBAL JUSTlCE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 89, 89-107 (D. French ed., forthcoming Oct. 2010).
83. The Case of the S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment No.9, 1927 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 10, at 14 (Sept.
7).
84. See Vaughan Lowe & Christopher Staker, Jurisdiction, in INTTERNATIONAL LAw 319 (M. Evans ed.,
2010). "Even if the characterization of international law as fundamentally consensual is accepted, it does not
follow that a sovereign State is free to do what it wishes." Id.
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era of globalization and interdependence. Perhaps it might thus be said that restrictions
upon the independence of states should not easily be assumed. We risk a disservice to the
international community if we conflate too readily what we would like the law to be with
what the law is. Some might suggest that this conflation of perspectives is intrinsic to
much of international legal scholarship. Koskenniemi has, for instance, had occasion to
remark that international law "exists as a promise of justice."85 It is true, as he goes on to
say, that such justice "cannot be enumerated in substantive values, interests or objec-
tives,"86 but nevertheless there is an aspect to international law that is "the announcement
of something that remains eternally postponed." 87 Of course, giving effect to certain fun-
damental societal values that are embedded within our doctrine is one thing; contempora-
neously denying that we do this in favor of a supposed objective narrative is a very
different matter altogether. Moreover, as Weil had occasion to note:
Vigilance, however, is imperative, lest too high a price be paid for the progress of
international law towards greater moral substance and greater solidarity . . . [Tihe
waning of ... positivity in favor of ill-defined values might well destabilize the whole
international normative system and turn it into an instrument that can no longer
serve its purpose.88
Even if one finds an approach to international law that is exclusively focused on state
behavior as too limited-as indeed most mainstream lawyers actually do-it surely still
behooves us, at the very least, to be aware of where the current law ends and the desidera-
tum begins.
V. Concluding Comment
At the end of her article, Charlesworth refers to "that pleasurable sense of international-
ist virtue that comes with being an international lawyer,"89 but suggests that this may have
to be given up if we are to become more self-critical (or at least self-reflective) of the role
we do have. I wouldn't disagree, but I would add that one of the facets of that "interna-
tionalist virtue" is also a responsibility on us to promote and support the international
legal system. Though the argument that international lawyers owe some kind of profes-
sional duty to the advancement of the legal system in which they work or study must itself
be another paper,90 what I really want to emphasize-and, in fact, conclude on-is that
such a responsibility is best served when we engage with the untidiness of the world, with
situations that fall outside our neat box of preordained legal outcomes.91 What doesn't
serve the international legal system is if the international lawyer simply writes off such
85. Martti Koskenniemi, What is International Law For?, in Malcolm Evans, INTERNATIONAL LAW, (Ox-
ford University Press, 2003), at I11.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 Am. J. INLr'. L. 413, 423 (1983).
89. Charlesworth, supra note 12, at 392.
90. See Schachter, supra note 7, at 226. "Since the governments of the world are likely to be ambivalent
about 'la conscience juridique,' the role of the nonofficial community of lawyers in giving that conception spe-
cific meaning and effect may well constitute the noblest function of our invisible college." Id.
91. See Alston, supra note 32, at 447 (relating the issue ofpower). "[I]nsufficient attention has been paid to
the questions of the nature of the international agenda and who sets and implements it." Id.
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difficulties as temporary aberrations, facts that the current system already answers or,
worse of all, that we feign arrogance of possessing the right-and only-answer. Rather,
as Hurrell notes, "[iut is certainly the case that both the strength and the fragility of inter-
national law derive from the need to maintain connections with both murky practice and
normative aspiration." 92 Perhaps because we are generally uncomfortable with the for-
mer, we have almost come to ignore it altogether and have focused a little too much on
the latter. But residing in the latter proves equally problematic, certainly if we are to
enter-and to be seen to be engaging with-the untidy politics of international relations.
Of course, we should not deny our professional competence. When Elizabeth Wilm-
shurst was asked by a member of the Chilcot Inquiry whether she felt it had been difficult
providing legal advice because Jack Straw as Foreign Secretary was a trained lawyer, her
reply-brutally swift-was, "[but] [h]e's not an international lawyer."93 Asserting our spe-
cialism is one thing; pretending that we exist and operate in splendid isolation from the
politics of international law is, however, another. Mainstream international lawyers might
want to learn from Odysseus, the Homeric king of Ithaca, as an example. 94 Described as
being polytropos, "[t]he man 'of many turns,'"95 he was wily, cunning, and adapted to any-
thing that was thrown at him by the gods, so that he never lost sight of his goal. Seeking
to inculcate some of these characteristics might not do the mainstream international law-
yer any harm at all.
92. Andrew Hurrell, Conclusion: International Law and the Changing Constitution of International Society, in
THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLTrics 332 (M. Byers ed., 2001).
93. Paul Reynolds, Straw's Clash with Lawyers Laid Bare at Iraq Inquiry, BBC, Jan. 26, 2010, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk-politics/8481588.stm.
94. Thanks to Dr. Etienne Dunant, a historian of ancient Greece, for this analogy.
95. See PIETRO PuccI, ODYSSEUs POLUjTROPos: LNTERTEXTUAL READINGS IN THE ODYSSEY AND THE
ILIAD 14-15, 128 (Cornell Univ. Press 1987).
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